My Profile

 

After leaving the Architecture of Consciousness project in August 2016, I joined the philosophy department at the University of Warwick as a Lecvehulme Early Career Research Fellow. My research project at Warwick is on the topic of Cognitive Phenomenology and my Warwick profile page can be found here. I started out as an undergrad studying philosophy at Clare College Cambridge. I have since completed a research Masters at the University of York and a PhD at the University of Sussex. I then spent a year as a Lecturer at the University of Glasgow before joining Manchester on the Architecture of Consciousness project in September 2013. 

 

I ALSO WORK IN THE INTERSECTION OF PHILOSOPHY AND BUSINESS. FOR MY BUSINESS WEBSITE, PLEASE GO TO: www.tommcclelland.org

Here are some of the issues I working on with the project:

 

The Admissible Contents of Experience: We can have perceptual experiences of low-level properties like colours and shapes, but can we also experience high-level properties like 'being a tomato' or 'being a beech'? I'm interested in whether empirical research on the perception of statistical properties and of scene categories might shed light on this debate. I'm also interested in how best to frame the distinction between high-level and low-level perceptual experience.

 

The Subjective Structure of Consciousness: What does it mean to say that conscious states are subjective? In what sense, if any, must experiences be owned? What are the varieties of self-consciousness? To what extent can the typical subjective structure of consciousness break down, and what can this reveal about the structure of experience? Questions such as these will be the focus of my postdoctoral research.

 

The Explanatory Gap: I am interested in whether and how we can justify the claim that consciousness is inexplicable in physical terms. I argue that there are really two explanatory gaps - one concerning the distinctive subjectivity of conscious experience and the other concerning its qualitative character.

 

Self-Representationalism: It has been suggested that what makes some mental states conscious is that they suitably represent themselves. I am interested in the implications this promising hypothesis has for our understanding of subjectivity and the problem of consciousness.

 

Russellian Monism: Some claim that despite our rich knowledge of the causal powers of physical entities, we are irremediably ignorant of their intrinsic nature: we know what things do but not what theyare. Russellian Monists suggest that the hidden intrinsic properties of physical entities are integral to the explanation of consciousness. Much of my past research has been concerned with whether and how Russellian Monism can solve the problem of consciousness. A great deal depends on which version of Russellian Monism you adopt. The 'Neo-Russellian Ignorance Hypothesis' is my own attempt to provide the best formulation of this view. This research has taken me beyond consciousness studies and into debates in metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of science and the history of philosophy surrounding the claim that we are ignorant of the intrinsic nature of external objects.

 

I also have an interest in Aesthetics and have a few publications on the Philosophy of Film. I am particular interested in the idea that a film can contribute to our philosophical understanding by playing a role analogous to that of a thought-experiment.

 

 

Papers and Presentations

 

Below are links to the papers and presentations I've been working on since joining the project. For links to work pre-dating the project, please go to my academia.edu page here.

 

 

'Ensemble Coding and Two Conceptions of Perceptual Sparsity' co-authored with Tim Bayne (letter published in Trends in Cognitive Science N.B. Access is behind a pay wall.)

 

'Concepts, Contents and Consciousness' co-authored with Tim Bayne (published in Neuroscience of Consciousness

 

'Gappiness and the Case for Liberalism About Phenomenal Properties' (published in Philosophical Quarterly)

 

Review of The Varieties of Consciousness By Uriah Kriegel (published in Philosophical Quarterly)

 

'Is the Virtual Self Theory Coherent?' (slides from recent talk at the BPS 'Variations in the Sense of Self' conference)

 

'What Can You See?' Blog entry on the content of perceptual experience for 'iCog'

 

Radio Show on the Problem of Consciousness with Dr Philip Goff on Resonance FM

 

'Affording Introspection: An Alternative Model of Inner Awareness' (Open Access paper published in Philosophical Studies)

 

'Receptivity and Phenomenal Self-Knowledge' (penultimate draft of paper published in Thought)

 

'The Problem of Consciousness: Easy, Hard or Tricky?' (draft of paper recently published in Topoi)

 

'Does Self-Representationalism Solve the Problem of Consciousness?' (paper published in Synthese)

 

'Review of R.J. Howell Consciousness and the Limits of Objectivity' (draft of review published in Journal of Consciousness Studies)

 

'Seeming Introspectible' (slides from a recent paper presented at Manchester Metropolitan University)

 

'Moving Forward on Russellian Physicalism' (slides from a recent paper presented at Charles University, Prague)

 

'Future-Proofing the Case Against Physicalism' (slides from a recent paper presented at the University of Liverpool)